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9You are looking at the front cover of the book 
Ways of Seeing written by John Berger in 
1972.[1] The text is the script of the TV series, 
and if you’ve seen the programmes, you can 
almost hear the distinctive pedagogic tone of 
Berger’s voice as you read his words: “The 
relation between what we see and what we 
know is never settled.”[2]
The image by Magritte on the cover 
further emphasises the point about the deep 
ambiguity of images and the always-present 
difficulty of legibility between words and see-
ing.[3] In addition to the explicit reference to 
the “artwork” essay by Walter Benjamin,[4] 
the TV programme employed Brechtian 
techniques, such as revealing the technical 
apparatus of the studio; to encourage view-
ers not to simply watch (or read) in an easy 
way but rather to be forced into an analysis 
of elements of “separation” that would lead 
to a “return from alienation”.[5] Berger further 
reminded the viewer of the specifics of the 
technical reproduction in use and its ideo-
logical force in a similar manner:
But remember that I am controlling and 
using for my own purposes the means 
of reproduction needed for these 
programmes […] with this programme 
as with all programmes, you receive 
images and meanings which are 
arranged. I hope you will consider what 
I arrange but please remain skeptical 
of it.
That you are not really looking at the 
book as such but a scanned image of a 
book — viewable by means of an embedded 
link to a server where the image is stored 
— testifies to the ways in which what, and 
how, we see and know is further unsettled 
through complex assemblages of elements. 
The increasing use of relational machines 
such as search engines is a good example 
of the ways in which knowledge is filtered at 
the expense of the more specific detail on 
how it was produced. Knowledge is now pro-
duced in relation to planetary computational 
infrastructures in which other agents such as 
algorithms generalise massive amounts of 
(big) data.[6]
Clearly algorithms do not act alone or 
with magical (totalising) power but exist as 
part of larger infrastructures and ideologies. 
Some well-publicised recent cases have 
come to public attention that exemplify a con-
temporary politics (and crisis) of representa-
tion in this way, such as the Google search 
results for “three black teenagers” and “three 
white teenagers” (mug shots and happy 
teens at play, respectively).[7] The problem 
is one of learning in its widest sense, and 
“machine learning” techniques are employed 
on data to produce forms of knowledge that 
are inextricably bound to hegemonic systems 
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Figure 1: The Cover of Ways of Seeing by John Berger 
(1972). Image from Penguin Books.
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of power and prejudice.
There is a sense in which the world be-
gins to be reproduced through computational 
models and algorithmic logic, changing what 
and how we see, think and even behave. 
Subjects are produced in relation to what 
algorithms understand about our intentions, 
gestures, behaviours, opinions, or desires, 
through aggregating massive amounts of 
data (data mining) and machine learning (the 
predictive practices of data mining).[8] That 
machines learn is accounted for through 
a combination of calculative practices that 
help to approximate what will likely happen 
through the use of different algorithms and 
models. The difficulty lies in to what extent 
these generalisations are accurate, or to 
what degree the predictive model is valid, or 
“able to generalise” sufficiently well. Hence 
the “learners” (machine learning algorithms), 
although working at the level of generalisa-
tion, are also highly contextual and specific 
to the fields in which they operate in a com-
ing together of what Adrian Mackenzie calls 
a “play of truth and falsehood”.[9]
Thus what constitutes knowledge can 
be seen to be controlled and arranged in 
new ways that invoke Berger’s earlier call for 
skepticism. Antoinette Rouvroy is similarly 
concerned that algorithms begin to define 
what counts for knowledge as a further 
case of subjectivation, as we are unable to 
substantively intervene in these processes of 
how knowledge is produced.[10] Her claim is 
that knowledge is delivered “without truth” 
through the increasing use of machines that 
filter it through the use of search engines that 
have no interest in content as such or detail 
on how knowledge is generated. Instead they 
privilege real-time relational infrastructures 
that subsume the knowledge of workers and 
machines into generalised assemblages as 
techniques of “algorithmic governmentality”.
[11]
In this sense, the knowledge produced 
is bound together with systems of power 
that are more and more visual and hence 
ambiguous in character. And clearly comput-
ers further complicate the field of visuality, 
and ways of seeing, especially in relation 
to the interplay of knowledge and power. 
Aside from the totalizing aspects (that I have 
outlined thus far), there are also significant 
“points of slippage or instability” of epistemic 
authority,[12] or what Berger would have no 
doubt identified as the further unsettling of the 
relations between seeing and knowing. So, 
if algorithms can be understood as seeing, 
in what sense, and under what conditions? 
Algorithms are ideological only inasmuch as 
they are part of larger infrastructures and 
assemblages.
Figure 2: The Ways of Seeing book cover image seen 
through an optical character recognition program. 
Created by SICV.
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But to ask whether machines can see 
or not is the wrong question to ask, rather 
we should discuss how machines have 
changed the nature of seeing and hence 
our knowledge of the world.[13] In this we 
should not try to oppose machine and human 
seeing but take them to be more thoroughly 
entangled — a more “posthuman” or “new 
materialist” position that challenges the onto-
epistemological character of seeing — and 
produces new kinds of knowledge-power 
that both challenges as well as extends the 
anthropomorphism of vision and its attach-
ment to dominant forms of rationality. Clearly 
there are other (nonhuman) perspectives 
that also illuminate our understanding of the 
world. This pedagogic (and political) impulse 
is perfectly in keeping with Ways of Seeing 
and its project of visual literacy.[14] What 
is required is an expansion of this ethic to 
algorithmic literacy to examine how machine 
vision unsettles the relations between what 
we see and what we know in new ways.
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Notes
[1] This essay was first commissioned 
by The Photographers Gallery for their 
Unthinking Photography series, https://
unthinking.photography/themes/machine-
vision/ways-of-machine-seeing. The title is 
taken from a workshop organised by the 
Cambridge Digital Humanities Network, con-
vened by Anne Alexander, Alan Blackwell, 
Geoff Cox and Leo Impett, and held at 
Darwin College, University of Cambridge, 
11 July 2016, http://www.digitalhumanities.
cam.ac.uk/Methods/waysofmachineseeing; 
a subsequent workshop, Ways of Machine 
Seeing 2017, is a two-day workshop 
organised by the Cambridge Digital 
Humanities Network, and CoDE (Cultures of 
the Digital Economy Research Institute) and 
Cambridge Big Data, to be held 26-28 June 
2017, http://www.digitalhumanities.cam.
ac.uk/Methods/woms2017/woms2017CFP.
[2] Ways of Seeing, ‪Episode 1 
(1972), ‬https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=0pDE4VX_9Kk. The 1972 BBC 
four-part television series of 30-minute films 
was created by writer John Berger and 
producer Mike Dibb. Berger’s scripts were 
adapted into a book of the same name, 
published by Penguin also in 1972. The 
book consists of seven numbered essays: 
four using words and images; and three 
essays using only images. See https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ways_of_Seeing.
[3] René Magritte, The Key of Dreams 
(1930), https://courses.washington.edu/
hypertxt/cgi-bin/book/wordsinimages/key-
dreams.jpg. Aside from the work of Magritte, 
Joseph Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs 
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Figure 3: Code by The Scandinavian Institute for Computational Vandalism.
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(1965) comes to mind, that makes a similar 
point in presenting a chair, a photograph of 
the chair, and an enlarged dictionary defini-
tion of the word “chair”, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs.
[4] The first section of the programme/book 
is acknowledged to be largely based on 
Benjamin’s essay “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/
philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm.
[5] The idea is that “separation” pro-
duces a disunity that is disturbing to the 
viewer/reader — Brecht’s “alienation-
effect” (Verfremdungeffekt) — and that 
this leads to a potential “return from 
alienation”. See https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Distancing_effect.
[6] To give a sense of scale and its conse-
quences, Facebook has developed the face-
recognition software DeepFace. With over 
1.5 billion users that have uploaded more 
than 250 billion photographs, it is allegedly 
capable of identifying any person depicted 
in a given image with 97% accuracy. See 
https://research.facebook.com/publications/
deepface-closing-the-gap-to-human-level-
performance-in-face-verification/.
[7] Antoine Allen “The ‘three black 
teenagers’ search shows it is society, 
not Google, that is racist”, The Guardian 
(10 June 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/10/
three-black-teenagers-google-racist-tweet.
[8] Adrian Mackenzie, “The Production of 
Prediction: What Does Machine Learning 
Want?,” European Journal of Cultural 
Studies, 18, 4–5 (2015): 431.
[9] Mackenzie, “The Production of 
Prediction,” 441.
[10] See, for instance, Antoinette Rouvroy’s 
“Technology, Virtuality and Utopia: 
Governmentality in an Age of Autonomic 
Computing,” in The Philosophy of Law 
Meets the Philosophy of Technology: 
Computing and Transformations of Human 
Agency, eds. Mireille Hildebrandt and 
Antoinette Rouvroy (London: Routledge, 
2011), 136–157.
[11] This line of argument is also close 
to what Tiziana Terranova has called an 
“infrastructure of autonomization”, making 
reference to Marx’s views on automation, 
particularly in his “Fragment on Machines”, 
as a description of how machines subsume 
the knowledge and skill of workers into 
wider assemblages. Tiziana Terranova, 
“Red Stack Attack! Algorithms, capital and 
the automation of the common”, Effimera 
(2014), accessed August 24, 2016, http://
effimera.org/red-stack-attack-algorithms-
capital-and-the-automation-of-the-common-
di-tiziana-terranova/.
[12] Mackenzie, “The Production of 
Prediction,” 441.
[13] I take this assertion from Benjamin 
once more, who considered the question 
of whether film or photography to be art 
secondary to the question of how art itself 
has been radically transformed:
“Earlier much futile thought had been 
devoted to the question of whether pho-
tography is an art. The primary question — 
whether the very invention of photography 
had not transformed the nature of art — was 
not raised. Soon the film theoreticians asked 
the same ill-considered question with regard 
to film.” https://www.marxists.org/reference/
subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm.
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[14] Berger was associated with The Writers 
and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 
aiming to “advance the needs of cultural 
literacy, rather than cater to an ‘advanced’ 
[academic] but limited readership” (From the 
Firm’s declaration of intent). In this sense it 
draws upon the Marxist cultural materialism 
of Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart’s 
The Uses of Literacy (1966).
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